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Abstract: On the aftermath of the global credit crunch was made clear that the Euro countries debt 
crisis shows that the EMU is far from being an Optimal Currency Area (OCA) under its current form. 
The countries accepted bailouts from their counterparts and international organizations in order to 
prevent the Eurozone collapse spreading the crisis further. Can the breakup to multiple areas help as 
Tootel (1990) suggested? Three possible sets of OCA scenarios are analyzed along with the 
demolition scenario. The breakup of the Eurozone to two currencies consisting possible OCAs along 
with a second one adding all the EU members and a third one applying in small regions. The 
scenarios are analyzed by using eleven equally weighted optimum area criteria to make Eurozone a 
single or a set of sustainable OCAs. These type and extension scenarios are presented for the first 
time for EU countries finding possible sets of independent country groups. The results show that the 
asymmetries lead to the crisis persist in a possible two or more “euros” area and this scenario cost is 
higher than union dissolution‟s. Europe cannot become in its current form a set of OCAs under any 
circumstances.  
Keywords: Asymmetries; OCA; monetary policy; dissolution scenarios  
JEL Classification: E42; E52; F41  
 
1. Introduction 
The current debt crisis in the Eurozone has made clear that the current form of 
EMU is far from being an Optimal Currency Area (OCA). Possible national market 
problems transferred through financial contagion channels to other countries as 
asymmetric shocks. The economic development is also asymmetric. Countries 
which share the same currency have different economic, social, political and legal 
framework, but they have to share the same monetary policy. The countries had 
also the obligation to bailout their weaker counterparts acting as lenders of last 
resort for them in order to maintain the union increasing their exposure to the initial 
financial infection. The loss of economic independence, the asymmetric shocks 
through contagion and the bailout obligation are the major disadvantages of EMU 
participation (Cohen, 2003). 
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The current scheme cannot last for long. There is no union withdraw process and if 
a country capable of forming an independent monetary policy wants to abandon the 
union or bankrupt the other countries will (or they should) lead union to dissolution 
because the costs related to the maintenance  of a broken monetary scheme are 
high(Blanchard, 2006). A possible dissolution scenario is analyzed along with the 
multiple OCA‟s scenario and a second set of scenarios adding more European 
countries to a new extended Eurozone. This analysis goes beyond the present 
literature because until now it was limited to exist and working monetary unions 
and not proposed ones.  After analyzing the characteristics of a possible OCA using 
the Mangas (1997) criteria I am presenting a set of 11 variables to make 
quantification on each country‟s characteristics. The voluntarily breakup of the 
union in new free floating currencies consisting of countries having common 
characteristics is presented. 
The paper is structured as follows: The next part is presenting the disadvantages of 
European monetary union. The third part provides the dissolution scenario. OCA 
requisitions, the relative data set and scenarios are presented on the forth part. On 
the final section I conclude based on data results criticizing the three scenarios and 
I propose incentives on possible further research.  
 
2. Monetary Union’s Problems and Disadvantages 
When the common European currency introduced back in 1999, the monetary 
union plausible advantages were overestimated while potential disadvantages were 
put aside. Since 1999 progress has been made. Intra-trade within EU has been 
stimulated because of the non-tariff and single market policy. Factor mobility has 
also been increased despite the limitations put by older members to their newer 
counterparts (countries accessed union after 2003). The price transparency is 
another advantage linked to the common currency creating benefits for business 
and consumers. Transaction costs which can appear in different ways (commissions 
and buying and selling prices spreads) eliminated within the zone (De Grauwe and 
Moesen, 2009). Despite its obvious advantages Eurozone is debated for its 
disadvantages. Some of them have been known and expected since its foundation. 
Despite early literature (Gros and Thygesen, 1998) and (Pszezolka, 2004) which 
emphasized on temporary negative effect of transaction costs this problem seems to 
be less important than the others. The most interesting fact has to do with 
disadvantages which weren‟t expected on their current extension. The problems are 
so severe nowadays leaving the existence of Eurozone under question (Masson, 
2011).  
The major expected disadvantage is the loss of monetary and national 
macroeconomic policy autonomy.  The introduction of a common central bank 
which handles the interest rate of Euro along with the single currency without 
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capital controls. Countries cannot determine their own monetary policy and 
inflation rate. The trade-off between unemployment and inflation is unable. The 
countries have to put their inflation in to the line with the lower inflation rate. 
Regional disparities are also present. Some union countries gain while others lose. 
Regional policies have fallen out of favor because of the political manipulation, 
economic adjustments delay and insufficient industries funding. Finally the 
exchange policy instrument was also lost, this loss wouldn‟t matter if they had only 
fiscal policy but the problem of external balance is also present. Whether the zone 
could have a balanced external trade, they experienced countries having surpluses 
and others having deficits (De Grauwe, 2003).  
The debt crisis showed the disadvantages of the monetary union which they 
weren‟t projected. Asymmetric shocks which had to be avoided for the counties of 
the monetary union were present because some countries were infected in the first 
stage of crisis (PIG debt problem) and within the union the problem amplified by 
contagion exposing initially not infected countries to credit risk transforming crisis 
to symmetric within the zone. (Costa Fernandes & Mota, 2011)  
Another unpredicted disadvantage has to do with the role of internal “lender of last 
resort” which countries were called to play recently. Countries having better 
economic results are forced from their political decision of bailing out weaker 
economies exposing themselves to other countries credit risk doubting whether 
they would receive their loans on the maturity dates or not. The lack of central 
policy or in other words political union among the European countries was a 
problem recognized even before the EMU creation. (Schinasi and Texeira, 2006) 
The Europeans hoped that the monetary union would lead to an extended political 
bonds creation. But, individual economic policies acts were actions against the 
mutual monetary policy.  
The Eurogroup where the political decisions related to Euro are unofficially but 
substantially taken, lost its confidence among the European citizens of being 
capable to plan and imply strong monetary policy. A future risk has to do with their 
exposure to weaker countries default. If a country within the zone cannot meet its 
repayments its lenders and reintroducing a national currency they will lose their 
funds and they will be forced to introduce immediately national currencies to avoid 
part of the dissolution later costs. As shown the disadvantages from the current 
scheme are many and difficult to solve. With its current form EMU cannot last for 
long.  In the next part we are about to see the dissolution scenario where a country 
is selecting to introduce a national currency in order to gain from a possible 
autonomous monetary policy, the effect of its decision to the other monetary union 
countries and the effects on their monetary policy change.(Robichaud, 2011).     
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3. Eurozone Dissolution Scenario 
A monetary union has never been made to be broken. But under unlucky political 
or economic circumstances none of the modern monetary unions has remained 
untouched and only microstates bonded to larger neighbor‟s currency monetary 
union and the CFA zone are still in operation for more than 50 years. The reason 
behind the long term existence has to do with the high cost of independent 
monetary policy. If a country cannot afford it could leave its monetary policy 
guided by the larger country or the union common central bank.  
 It would order to find the reasons of breakup excluding the cases of previous 
political disintegration (Former USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia 
respectively) (Fidrmuc and Horvath, 1998) bonding or dollarization (many cases in 
Central and South America). In this case though we can presume that this 
dissolution scenario refers to the voluntary participation unions such as Eurozone. 
With exception of high political risk incentives to secede are developed because of 
inefficiencies due to integration.  
A country in order to leave the EMU will face a large depreciation of its currency 
followed by exports decline, transition costs and political and economic risk rise. 
(Blanchard, 2006) But it will leave if its cost of national currency reintroduction is 
lower than the maintained cost of being a part of a monetary union in the long 
term. Leaving a monetary zone cannot be a single side decision and unions don‟t 
have a smooth and volunteer leaving process by their creation, only temporary 
solutions can be proposed. (Fuchs and Lippi, 2005) We exclude the parallel 
circulation of both national and common currency which cannot last for long due to 
Gresham‟s law (Mundell, 1988). On the other hand we propose three plausible 
scenarios: the voluntarily withdraw of a country from the union, the dissolution and 
the reintroducing of national currencies. The remaining countries to the zone will 
also have strong incentives to leave the zone immediately because there is a 
possibility to avoid the majority of the high broken zone maintenance cost and gain 
from the strong motive of autonomous monetary policy profits.  
The point where a monetary union dissolute is also an important issue. When a 
country leaves a scheme if its size can work as a monetary policy individual the 
scheme breaks down. Comparisons cannot be made between EMU and Latin 
Monetary Union which can be considered more as a fixed rates club. There wasn‟t 
common currency and one central bank. Monetary discipline was also absent. Thus 
there was no single currency or central bank for a long time to abandon and the 
members‟ commitment was loose the consequences from the national currencies 
mint didn‟t have negative effects on members economies.(Bae and Bailey, 2011).      
The possible devaluation long-term positive effects in competitiveness are the 
major motive that the breaking country has to leave the monetary union. The 
reintroducing national currency costs are high and a possible decision has to be 
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taken by monetary authorities is analyzed in various categories of cost acting as 
barriers for a possible exit. (Fuchs and Lippi, 2005)   
An initial effect of the reintroducing announcement is the rise of risk and interest 
rates on countries‟ debt, not only for the abandoning country but for the whole 
zone. This is a penalty for the leaving country, but also for the others that let the 
union broke. Credit ratings will lower increasing the pressure on the now 
independent central bank to raise interest rates and further devaluation.   
Internal economic problems also occur. To regain its competitiveness a country 
should reduce, according to an earlier work (Blanchard, 2006) referring to the case 
of Portugal as a possible leaving country, a 25% wage reduction as to be made. 
Further reduction to the wages will follow possible trade flows from abroad. 
Because of its inconvenience, due to unfair manipulating monetary issues failing to 
maintain the previous commitment of monetary union will imply a tariff to their 
exports to the breaking country. In order to maintain its competitiveness country 
must transfer this tariff to its workers as a wage reduction. This compensatory tariff 
can be also followed by unfair monetary exchange rate policy to attract FDI or 
restrictions to their citizen‟s freedom.        
Political disintegration is another major consequence of the economic and 
monetary independence. An abandoning country, something that is no provision in 
the European Union, obviously didn‟t estimate the profits from the political 
integration. The other members won‟t easy participate to discussions for common 
foreign policy and a European Army creation. Through this process weaker 
countries are excluded from the European Union decisions and in a later stage from 
the Union itself. This would have also a major effect on their international trade 
position against these countries and the European Union because all participants 
will lose EU membership and its benefits. This will lead to higher country risk 
added interest cost.  
Reintroducing new currency also involves technical and legal obstacles. Some of 
those are associated with the initial competitiveness depreciation itself. In order to 
be effective the currency introduction should be followed by debt and savings 
redenomination inside the country otherwise it will lead to financial distress and 
bankruptcies. All money working equipment (ATMs, Payment machines, airport 
handlers etc.) must be reprogrammed; notes and coins have to be minted and 
placed all over the country. A short period of double circulation is also important 
for the smoothest possible transition, raising further costs.  
In any case more measures will be needed to keep people from massive withdraws, 
and bank runs to foreign banks. A “corralito” limit to bank withdrawals can be an 
immediate remedy but it cannot be a long term measure. The bond issues cannot be 
easy accepted by international markets having a junk rating status and interest rates 
will rise further. Redenomination of the foreign debt is also plausible out of favor 
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of the positioned investors who will have great loss of the country‟s inconvenience. 
If they law suit the country in the European court of justice they will receive 
remedy because the court won‟t be favor against braking country.  
The other members will have to pay the increased cost occurred by the country‟s 
retirement. Unless their action is coordinated and rapid they will have to pay a 
short term cost which is 50% devaluation and further devaluation in the long term, 
the possible share of the leaving country to the ECB, the possible bailouts given 
will be under question and the loss from the possible independent monetary policy. 
If the remaining countries coordinate their action of introducing national currencies 
they will keep their political sustainability keeping their competitiveness and wages 
level and they won‟t have to bail out their joint central bank. Markets will be 
probably positive in a possible common action looking to the future of the 
countries. People are also favorite to their national currencies and the political 
decision may be easier. The sunk cost which cannot be avoided in any case consists 
of the credit risk lowering costs compared to the zone maintenance and the loss of 
debt repayments plus technical cost (Boonstra, 2010). 
In any case this scenario seems to have large cost for all the countries but the cost 
for the leaving country will be unbearable. In real life a country won‟t easy let 
voluntarily the union to dissolute and the others will decide to abandon the union 
when the exposure to possible delayed or lost debt repayments will be already high. 
 
4. OCA Scenarios 
Making Eurozone an OCA in the long term has been the ultimate goal since its 
foundation. Possible multiple breakup to a set of more than one OCAs (Tootel 
1990) could be more operative and effective. A more realistic target is the 
implement of a common interest system allowing countries to participate in the 
financial markets equally with the implementation of an interest equalization tax 
within the zone as a presumption of the short term effective monetary policy along 
with specific and customized in each country‟s needs to eliminate regional 
disparities transforming zone to an OCA. These scenarios of multiple OCAs and 
interest equalization tax implementation are analyzed in the present sector.   
In a similar work (Monga, 1997) author listed 19 relevant criteria for a successful 
currency union in Francophone Africa. The level of freedom in certain sectors of 
the economy is crucial for creating or maintaining monetary unions. More freedom 
means larger flexibility for the referring country making it keen to accept needed 
transformations to be a part of an OCA. The OCA countries levels have to be equal. 
I made transformations to the original variables in order to transform them to meet 
my current research criteria. I have deployed the latest (2012) dataset from 
Heritage foundation for economic freedom scores (Business, Trade, Fiscal, 
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Government spending, investment, fiscal, property rights, Freedom from corruption 
and labor freedom), political risk from Euromoney country and credit rating from 
international agencies respectively consisting an 11 variables dataset. In (Monga, 
1997) the measure is ordinal and based on estimates. Integer values range from -2 
(heavy disadvantage or incentive) to +2 (strong advantage) using zero (0) if the 
effect is neutral. The variables have the same weight and added to make a final 
index.  
In contrast to the referred one (Monga, 1997) I used quantitive data provided by 
referred sources using as population the specific scores for each series calculating 
its average and standard deviation omitting zero (0). The methodology choice has 
to do with the fact that asymmetries are present.  I use these descriptive measures 
to give each country a score for each variable. The higher deviation means higher 
asymmetry. Thus, the effective grouping to two has to be made on the basis of 
higher asymmetries of the population average. The constructing of the indices is 
following the deviation ordination pattern. If the value is smaller than one standard 
deviation from the mean I note it as a heavy disadvantage (-2), from one standard 
deviation to mean (not included) is a minus one (-1), from mean to one standard 
deviation (not included) variable is a plus one (+1) and finally if the value is more 
than one standard deviation it takes a plus two (+2). Countries with positive final 
index can be counted as possible candidates for an OCA scheme and negative final 
index means that the country has to make possible transformations in order to 
improve its score or its candidate to format another OCA with other low final index 
countries. The results are shown on the following table.  
The results show that 10 countries (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Luxemburg and Netherlands) have positive final index 
showing that their scores are close and are primary candidates for an OCA. The 
other 7 countries have negative score (Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia and Spain) which means that they cannot be members of an 
OCA with their current scores and have to make transformations to join a common 
area. In a possible multiple currency areas scenario these two groups seem to 
consist the initial group of the two new Euros.  A “hard” one based on positive 
score countries and a “soft” one based on negative score countries. Possible 
advantages of this scheme are obvious. The control of the monetary policy is more 
flexible for a participating country than the larger union. Political cost seems to be 
lower than the dissolution‟s scenario. The regional asymmetries are expected to be 
smaller because countries scores and characteristics are closer. The markets will be 
easier to accept this division and transition costs will be lower.       
The creation of multiple currency areas has some fundamental presumptions. 
Initially the countries consisting a new monetary zone must accept that the two 
currencies will free float between them. Otherwise the scheme substantially doesn‟t 
change and its problems remain. Additionally there is no OCA if the participating 
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countries don‟t share the same borders because the trade volume isn‟t so high 
among the zone countries.  
In current scenario Cyprus and Slovak republic don‟t border with the other 
participants and they have to be excluded facing the cost of an abandoning country 
facing a major disadvantage for the scenario The results of the 9 countries “Hard 
Euro” and 6 countries ”Soft Euro” are shown below:  
 
Table 1.  
 
Table 2. “Hard" Euro scenario 
 
Country Name
Business 
Freedom
Trade 
Freedom
Fiscal 
Freedom
Gov't 
Spending
Monetary 
Freedom
Investment 
Freedom
Financial 
Freedom
Property 
Rights
Freedom from 
Corruption
Labor 
Freedom
Gov't Expenditure 
% of GDP 
pol. Risk credit rating final index
Austria -2 1 -2 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 -1 1 2 8
Belgium 2 1 -2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 -2 1 1 10
Cyprus -1 -2 2 -1 2 -1 1 1 -1 2 1 1 -1 3
Estonia -1 1 2 -2 -2 2 2 1 -1 1 2 -1 -1 3
Finland 2 1 1 2 -1 1 2 2 2 -2 -2 2 2 12
France 1 -2 -1 2 1 -2 1 1 1 -1 -2 1 2 2
Germany 2 1 -1 1 1 1 -1 2 1 -2 1 1 2 9
Greece -1 -2 1 2 -1 -2 -1 -2 -2 -1 -1 -2 -2 -14
Ireland 2 1 1 -1 -1 2 1 2 1 2 1 -1 -1 9
Italy -1 1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 -2 -2 -1 -1 -1 -1 -9
Luxembourg -1 1 1 -2 1 2 2 2 1 -1 2 2 2 12
Malta -2 1 -1 -1 -2 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -11
Netherlands 1 1 -2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 -1 1 2 12
Portugal -1 1 -1 2 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -2 -1 -2 -1 -8
Slovak Republic -2 1 2 -2 -1 -1 1 -2 -2 1 2 -1 -1 -5
Slovenia 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 -2 -2 -1 -2 1 1 -1 -6
Spain -1 1 -1 -1 1 1 2 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 -2
Business 
Freedom
Trade 
Freedom
Fiscal 
Freedom
Gov't 
Spending
Monetary 
Freedom
Investment 
Freedom
Financial 
Freedom
Property 
Rights
Freedom 
from 
Corruption
Labor 
Freedom
Gov't 
Expenditure 
% of GDP 
pol. Risk
credit 
rating
Final 
Index 
Austria -2 1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 1 1 2 -1 1 1 1
Belgium 1 1 -2 -1 1 -1 -1 -2 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -7
Estonia -1 1 2 2 -2 1 1 -2 -2 -1 2 -2 -2 -3
Finland 2 1 1 -1 -1 1 1 1 2 -2 -1 1 1 6
France 1 -2 -1 -2 2 -2 -1 -1 -2 -1 -2 -1 1 -11
Germany 1 1 -1 1 2 1 -2 1 1 -2 1 1 1 6
Ireland 1 1 1 1 -1 1 -2 1 1 2 1 -2 -2 3
Luxembourg -2 1 1 2 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 2 2 1 9
Netherlands -1 1 -1 -1 1 1 1 1 2 1 -1 1 1 6
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Table 3. “Soft" Euro scenario 
 
Table  4. All EU scenario 
 
As we can see the asymmetries were smoothened but they didn‟t eliminate. In the 
“Hard Euro” France, Belgium and Estonia and in the “Soft Euro” Greece, Italy and 
Portugal seem to be week. The problems didn‟t solve and in fact the dissolution is 
still extremely plausible and the total cost of this scenario is larger compared to 
national currencies introduction.   
Another possible innovative OCA scenario has to do with the creation of multiple 
OCAs adding future Euro participants. Countries that will adopt Euro in the next 
years could be a fruitful addition for the creation of one or more OCAs. Using the 
same 11 variables on the index creation we added all the 2003-2007 expansion non 
euro members (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and 
Romania respectively) plus the two joining members of the EU (Croatia and 
Iceland). The change is the use of zero because some countries are not currently 
members of Eurozone and their participation can be a political choice. The results 
for all 27 countries are shown to the following table:  
The results show that twelve countries now have positive scores (Austria, Czech 
Rep, Estonia, Finland, Germany Iceland, Ireland Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, 
Netherlands and Slovakia), two countries have scored zero (Malta and Spain) and 
Country 
Business 
Freedom
Trade 
Freedom
Fiscal 
Freedom
Gov't 
Spending
Monetary 
Freedom
Investment 
Freedom
Financial 
Freedom
Property 
Rights
Labor 
Freedom
pol. Risk
credit 
rating
Final Index 
Greece -1 -2 2 -1 -1 -2 -1 -2 1 -2 -2 -10
Italy -1 1 -2 -2 1 1 -1 -2 -1 -1 -1 -7
Malta -2 1 1 1 -2 1 -1 1 2 1 1 6
Portugal 1 1 -1 -1 2 -1 -1 1 -2 -1 1 -2
Slovenia 2 1 1 1 -1 -1 -2 -1 -1 2 1 0
Spain -1 1 -1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 13
NAME
Property 
Rights
Freedom 
from 
Corruption
Fiscal 
Freedom 
Gov't 
Spending
Business 
Freedom
Labor 
Freedom
Trade 
Freedom
Investment 
Freedom 
Financial 
Freedom
Political  
Risk 
Credit 
Rating 
Overall 
score 
Austria 0 0 -1 -1 -1 1 0 0 0 0 0 -2
CzechRepublic 0 -1 0 0 -1 1 0 -1 0 0 0 -2
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Finland 0 1 0 -2 1 -1 0 0 0 1 1 1
Germany 0 0 0 0 1 -1 0 0 -1 0 1 0
Iceland 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -2
Ireland 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 -1 -1 0
Latvia -1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 -1 -1 -6
Lithuania 0 -1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -1 0
Luxembourg 0 0 0 1 0 -1 0 1 0 0 1 2
Netherlands 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Slovakia -1 -1 0 1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2
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thirteen countries scored negative (Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, France 
Greece, Hungary , Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Slovenia). On the same 
motive we make a set of two OCAs. The results are shown to the following table.  
   Table 5. All EU scenario “Hard” Euro   
  
We also see that the asymmetries remain in the extended model. The same 
problems are still present. More developed countries will benefit from a possible 
union and the weakest countries will still have to carry the costs of a possible 
monetary union. The size of these possible OCAs is large and it could be the reason 
for the existence of the asymmetries.    
A final OCA scenario could be a set of regional unions that seems to be easier to 
coordinate. We choose to present three possible scenarios. A Balkan monetary 
union with the exception of the Euro‟s weak link Greece, a union consisting of 
Visegrad and Baltics in a common region and finally a scenario using Visegrad 
itself. The results are shown to the following set of tables.  
      Table 6. All EU scenario “Soft” Euro 
NAME
Property 
Rights
Freedom 
from 
Corruption
Fiscal 
Freedom 
Gov't 
Spending
Business 
Freedom
Labor 
Freedom
Trade 
Freedom
Investment 
Freedom 
Financial 
Freedom
Poltical  
Risk 
Credit 
Rating 
Overall score 
Belgium 1 1 -1 -1 2 1 0 1 0 1 1 6
Bulgaria -1 -1 1 1 0 1 0 -1 0 0 0 0
Croatia -1 0 0 0 -2 0 0 0 0 0 0 -3
Cyprus 0 0 1 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0
France 1 1 -1 -1 0 0 -1 -1 0 1 1 0
Greece 0 -1 0 -1 0 -1 -1 -1 0 -2 -2 -9
Hungary 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Italy 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1
Malta 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 -1
Romania -1 -1 1 1 -1 0 0 1 -1 0 0 -1
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 -1
Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
NAME
Property 
Rights
Freedom 
from 
Corruption
Fiscal 
Freedom 
Gov't 
Spending
Business 
Freedom
Labor 
Freedom
Monetary 
Freedom
Trade 
Freedom
Investment 
Freedom 
Financial 
Freedom
Political Risk Credit Rating Overall score 
CzechRepublic 0 -1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Estonia 1 2 0 0 0 -1 0 0 1 0 1 1 5
Hungary 0 0 0 0 1 0 -1 0 0 0 -1 -1 -2
Latvia -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1 0 -4
Lithuania 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Poland 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 -2
Slovakia -1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2
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Table 7. Balkan monetary union 
 
Table 8. Visegrad and Baltics  
 
Table 9. Visegrad scenario  
 
NAME
Property 
Rights
Freedom 
from 
Corruption
Fiscal 
Freedom 
Gov't 
Spending
Business 
Freedom
Labor 
Freedom
Monetary 
Freedom
Trade 
Freedom
Investment 
Freedom 
Financial 
Freedom
Political Risk Credit Rating Overall Score
CzechRepublic 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 3
Hungary 0 0 0 -1 1 0 -1 0 0 0 -1 -1 -3
Poland 0 1 -1 0 -1 0 0 0 1 -1 0 0 -1
Slovakia -1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 0 0 0 0 0 -1
NAME Property Rights
Freedom from 
Corruption
Fiscal 
Freedom 
Gov't 
Spending
Business 
Freedom
Labor 
Freedom
Monetary 
Freedom
Trade 
Freedom
Investment 
Freedom 
Financial 
Freedom
Political Risk Credit Rating Overall Score
Bulgaria -1 -1 1 0 0 1 0 -2 0 0 0 -2 -4
Croatia 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -2
Cyprus 1 1 0 0 1 0 -2 0 1 0 -1 1 2
Italy 0 0 -1 -1 0 -1 0 0 0 0 1 -2 -4
Malta 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 6
Romania 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -2
Slovenia 0 1 0 -1 1 -1 0 0 -1 0 0 -1 -2
NAME 
Property 
Rights
Freedom 
from 
Corruption
Fiscal 
Freedom 
Gov't 
Spending
Business 
Freedom
Labor 
Freedom
Trade 
Freedom
Investment 
 Freedom 
Financial 
Freedom
Political Risk Credit Rating
Overall 
score
Austria 1 1 -1 -1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2
Belgium 0 0 -1 -1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1
Bulgaria -2 -1 1 1 0 1 0 -1 0 0 0 -1
Croatia -1 -1 0 1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2
Cyprus 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2 0 0 0 0 -2
CzechRepublic 0 0 0 0 -1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2
Finland 1 1 0 -1 1 -1 0 0 1 1 1 4
France 0 0 -1 -1 0 0 -2 -1 0 0 1 -4
Germany 1 1 0 0 1 -1 0 0 -1 1 1 3
Greece -1 -1 0 -1 0 -1 -2 0 0 -2 -2 -10
Hungary 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -1 0 -1 0 -1
Iceland 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5
Ireland 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 4
Italy -1 -1 -1 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 -4
Latvia -1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Lithuania 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 3
Luxembourg 1 1 0 1 0 -1 0 1 0 1 1 5
Malta 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Netherlands 1 1 -1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 5
Poland 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 -1 0 0 0 -2
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 -1 -1 0 -3
Romania -1 -1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 -1
Slovakia -1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 -1 0 0 -2
Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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The results still show the asymmetries that follow all the OCA scenarios in Europe. 
Nobody can claim that even smaller regions can consist under Tootel‟s (1990) 
hypothesis that we can make many (4-5 probably) small regional monetary unions 
in Europe the solution is obviously not the division of countries to regions or 
multiple monetary unions.  
 
5.  Conclusions  
The present work has presented three sets of possible scenarios related to 
transformations for the EMU future to smaller areas that can smooth the 
asymmetries. Present debt crisis is testing the durability and long prosperity of the 
union. It was on the decision dead-end under this pressure as a motive for reform 
and crucial decisions having to do with the possible maintenance of the monetary 
union. The dissolution or breakup cost seems to be extremely high for all the 
participating countries and the problems doesn‟t seem to be solved by a breakup 
into multiple OCAs of any size hiding a possible future dissolution of the smaller 
unions cost.  
The first decision that it has to be made is an opportunity cost choice. Countries 
want to pay the cost of possible dissolution or EU and EMU maintenance? Political 
decisions related to liberation reforms and transformations and the change of the 
economic environment seem to be critical for the long term sustainability but the 
time for the implication of a tighter union under the present turbulence seems to be 
inadequate. Further sustainability based solutions have to be developed in contrast 
to the dissolution scenarios for Eurozone and furthermore for European Union 
itself.  
A single OCA is preferable for all the countries and in a possible work authors can 
develop a long term forecast analysis for the possible time of creation under the 
existing or future EU form. Until then the Eurozone countries have to be saved 
from the possible costs of dissolution in any form. 
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